Foster/Mitchell

I missed the part about posting by 6pm but from Foster a couple things stand out to me (as best I can understand the Lacanian jargon):

First, that the Perseus myth can be taken to represent the triumph of Apollonian reason over the Dionysian sublime. Perseus’ victory over Medusa restores the a priori categories of thought that the Medusan figure (as both male/female, ugly/beautiful etc) threatened to annihilate.

Second, that the image screen – the mirror in the Perseus myth – serves to “tame” the gaze. If Medusa is fundamentally lack, Athena’s appropriation of Medusa’s head is an expression of the hope that the lack in the Other can be effaced. Representation thus serves as a cover for lack – although a direct confrontation with Medusa is impossible in the myth narrative, as artistic representation we are able to confront her gaze.

However, Medusa remains an ambivalent figure. While the victory of Perseus in the myth narrative ostensibly reaffirms the primacy of culture/reason, the very representation of Medusa undermines that narrative and serves as a reminder of the power of the gaze. As Foster notes, while painting can be considered an Apollonian medium (as opposed to the music of the satyrs), Caravaggio’s attempt to render Medusa on a three dimensional surface threatens to disturb the integrity of its illusion.

In this way, while representation may seek to control the gaze returned from the object (the thing-in-itself), Foster rejects Lacan’s claim that the image screen must serve only to “tame” the gaze. By reflecting upon the act of representation itself, Foster seems to think that art can provide a glimpse of the Real.

So, turning to ekphrasis, I see a similar model. Ekphrastic hope is roughly equivalent to any attempt to hide the lack in the Other. Through “the overcoming of otherness,” ekphrastic hope would seek to positively confront the radical alterity of the Medusan figure. By ensuring consistency in the big Other, ekphrastic hope is the hope that we can truly name the thing-in-itself.

On the other hand, fascination with different media, as in both Lessing and McLuhan, is somewhat symptomatic. While pragmatically word and image are interchangeable (i.e. communication is possible) there nonetheless is a persisting doubt or suspicion of lack in the Other.

Mitchell I think neatly ties this up with our real life socio-cultural relations to other people. We are always simultaneously drawn towards and away from others. At least personally, the possibility of truly expressing oneself (i.e. obtaining some kind of inter-subjective understanding) is something that persistently concerns me. I like the way Foster puts the position of the subject being seen as a question of mastery. If words are unable to name the thing-in-itself, then static identities are impossible. You can, in Nietzsche’s terms, ‘become who you are’ through the will to power (the aesthetic impulse).

However, I’m not really sure about the sections after that. Mitchell says that our ambivalence towards ekphrasis is something that needs to be “worked through” like one would “work through” an ideological fantasy, but I’m not sure exactly how the romantic poetry reflects this.